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Abstract 
Evidence has been accumulating that UK infrastructure is under enormous pressure and is holding back 
economic growth. Although these problems have been receiving increasing attention from media and 
political commentators, there has been little effort to understand systematically their policy and 
institutional roots. This paper fills this gap by examining the political economy of infrastructure policy and 
presenting a series of case studies to illustrate our theoretical predictions. We find evidence that the 
British political system amplifies the risk of policy failure around infrastructure in the form of short-
sightedness, policy instability, a weak evidence base and a lack of public consent.  
 
Introduction 
 
Infrastructure1 plays an important role in facilitating economic growth and there is substantive evidence 
that suggests the UK economy is being held back by lack of investment, mainly in the transport and 
energy sectors (e.g. Novella et al. /RQGRQIRUH[DPSOHKDVVRPHRI(XURSH¶VPRVWFRQJHVWHG
roads, with the average driver in 2014 spending about 96 hours stuck in traffic 2 . Airport capacity 
constraints, especially in the South East of England, causes delays, cancellations and unreliability for 
passengers, driving up air fares, and damaging the UK¶VFRQQHFWLYLW\ $LUSRUWV&RPPLVVLRQ ,Q
the energy sector, the capacity margin has been declining, triggering a rush of costly policy initiatives 
and emergency regulatory measures designed to ensure the lights stay on (e.g. Helm, 2013, Ofgem, 
2015). Shale oil/gas extraction through hydraulic fracturing3, which ministers and industry were hopeful 
might spark a revolution LQ%ULWDLQ¶VHQHUJ\PDUNHWKDVEHHQVHULRXVO\KHOGEDFNE\ ORFDO FRPPXQLW\
opposition. 
 
There is prima facie evidence that these problems are intrinsically related to distortions in policymaking. 
For example, in the past decade and a half, energy policy has been notorious for failing to anticipate 
investment needs and providing a sound regulatory framework for private investors. Perennial 
controversies surrounding some of the most expensive infrastructure projects for the UK taxpayer, such 
as the planned, £50bn HS2 high-speed railway between London, the West Midlands, and the North of 
England are symptomatic of serious weaknesses in the way policymaking is grounded in technical 
evidence. The tortuous debate about aviation capacity in the South East of England which spans across 
more than four decades, and is yet to produce an effective way of tackling congestion iQWKH8.¶VPDLQ
international gateways, is a tale of the struggle of the British political system to successfully reconcile the 
widespread economic benefits of a large-scale infrastructure project with the perceived costs they bring 
                                                        
1 Broadly defined as capital intensive projects in energy, transport, water, digital communications, waste disposal 
networks, and strategic flood defences. 
2 Based on data from http://inrix.com/scorecard/.  
3 A technique in which water and chemicals are pumped into shale at high pressure to extract gas and oil. 
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to local communities. Local opposition to shale oil/gas extraction is another case in point. The best laid 
plans have often crumbled because of a lack of local community consent, and have led to an 
increasingly litigious environment, where judicial reviews and other legal challenges often play a decisive 
role. 
 
The paradox is that, despite the mounting evidence that points to pervasive policy failures, there has 
been little academic effort to connect these problems to the inner working of policymaking around 
infrastructure, and ultimately to the institutional architecture within which they operate. The few studies 
that come close to taking this approach have concentrated more on developing normative proposals for 
policy and institutional reform rather than offering a thorough examination of the pitfalls of current 
SROLF\PDNLQJSURFHVVHVDQG WKHLU LQWHUSOD\ZLWK WKH8.¶VPDFURSROLW\ HJ+HOP$JKLRQ et al. 
2013; Armitt, 2013). 
 
This article aims to help fill this gap. Our key research aim is to provide a better understanding of the 
institutional roots of apparent policy failures in the area of infrastructure investment in the UK. To that 
end, we combine theoretical analysis and empirical evidence. At the theoretical level, we bridge 
literatures across academic disciplines to provide a new account of the political economy of 
infrastructure. At the empirical level, we present a series of case studies of recent, high-profile 
infrastructure investment decisions in the energy, transport and water sectors. Although these cases do 
not formally test our theoretical claims, they offer useful heuristics for illustrating how the identified 
mechanisms work in practice. Moreover, we are confident that, taken together, these paradigmatic 
H[DPSOHVRIIHUDFUHGLEOHµSODXVLELOLW\SUREH¶*HRUJe and Bennett, 2005) of the validity of our theoretical 
expectations.  
 
To anticipate the key arguments, our work shows that the British (and Scottish) polity is associated with 
important deficiencies in policymaking around infrastructure, mostly in the form of short-sightedness, 
instability, a poor evidence base and fragile public consent. The mechanisms driving this behaviour are 
threefold. Firstly, while in theory the UK Westminster model is expected to deliver stable, decisive 
government, in practice, the lack of consensus-building capabilities undermines policy effectiveness 
where long-term commitment and credibility is crucial. Secondly, an adversarial political culture creates 
incentives for parties and interest groups to use information in ways that damage the quality of 
policymaking. Finally, electoral incentives expose decisions to the disproportionate influence of marginal 
constituencies. Our core argument is that at the heart of these problems is a gap in the institutional 
architecture around infrastructure investment; that the UK lacks effective forums where politicians, 
experts, interest groups, and local communities can engage in structured, informed deliberation and 
negotiation around policy options.  
 
2XUXOWLPDWHDPELWLRQLVWROHDGDQHZJHQHUDWLRQRIUHVHDUFKLQWRWKHµSROLWLFVRISROLF\¶LQWKH8.7KH
idea is to identify problems in the structure of incentives that underlie policy failures with an eye to frame 
a debate about possible institutional innovations and solutions. This is a critical contribution in its own 
right. As a case in point, the LSE Growth Commission called for the further investigation of the 
institutional constraints of the UK economy (Aghion et al., 2013). That said, our study may have 
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analytical and comparative merits beyond the British case. For one thing, it offers a micro perspective 
into the link between institutions and economic performance. Existing scholarship on the political 
sources of growth and equality focuses mainly on the effects of macro, monetary and fiscal affairs (e.g. 
Persson and Tabellini, 2003). Yet, micro policy areas such as infrastructure policy are relatively 
neglected. Our contribution stresses the importance of allowing for the effects of a more finely-graded 
range of policy dimensions of economic prosperity. For another, this study may stimulate research into 
the interface between political economy (e.g. Besley, 2007) and political institutions (e.g. Lijphart, 1999, 
2012). Building bridges between these literatures is crucial for developing a more nuanced account of 
the incentives structure shaping public choices.  
 
The article is organised as follows. The next section examines the key economic and political constraints 
surrounding the formulation of infrastructure policy. Section two examines the political economy around 
infrastructure in the UK, reflecting on how we might expect the political system to perform in this area. 
Section three presents a number of case studies which illustrate our core arguments. Section four 
outlines key findings and policy implications, charting a way forward for reforming the governance of 
infrastructure investment.    
 
I. The economics and politics of infrastructure 
 
Investment in infrastructure usually involves the creation of long-lived assets and high sunk costs, which 
in turn generate problems of time inconsistency/credible commitment. In other words, private investors 
will only be prepared to commit to financing these projects if future customers agree, in a long-term 
contract, to cover average costs and refrain from behaving opportunistically (e.g. Jamison et al., 2005; 
Trillas, 2010). In practice, such long-term contracts require governments, usually through regulators, to 
guarantee that future consumers will pay a price that reflects average costs. Government intervention is 
also required to handle a wide range of externalities that are typically associated with large-scale 
infrastructure projects, from environmental impacts to disruption and congestion imposed on local 
communities where projects are sited. 
 
Making informed decisions about infrastructure investment is very challenging. It often involves long-
WHUPFRPPLWPHQWVZLWKSRWHQWLDOWRµORFNLQ¶WKHHFRQRP\LQXQVXLWDEOHLQIUDVWUXFWXUHV\VWHPVIRUPDQ\
years, seriously harming future economic prosperity (e.g. Bottini et al., 2013). Avoiding such an outcome 
requires robust analysis of the long-term effects of alternative infrastructure systems across a wide 
range of uncertain future scenarios. It entails understanding the drivers of demand for infrastructure 
services in the future, and how different infrastructure configurations might be able to meet that demand 
(e.g. Tran et al., 2014). It needs to consider the ways in which existing economic activities are likely to 
respond to new infrastructure investments, as well as how these investments may facilitate the 
emergence of new, potentially quite different, activities. This requires a strategic, network-oriented 
approach that goes well beyond a project-by-project analysis of specific investment proposals (e.g. 
Grimes, 2008, 2010). 
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Unsurprisingly, therefore, most of the publicly available information about the (predicted) effects of large 
infrastructure projects on the economy and on specific groups is highly controversial. The assumptions 
and methodologies that influence the evaluation of policy options are almost invariably highly 
contestable and contested (e.g. Pindyck, 2015). The goals that projects seek to achieve and the 
interests they serve involve clear trade-offs, and as a result, are often subject to dispute (Douglas and 
Wildavsky, 1983; Kalra et al., 2014).  
 
Conflicting interests, opinions and values make the politics of infrastructure investment especially 
difficult. To facilitate a constructive public and political debate, it becomes crucial to engage all the 
relevant affected groups in the development of the evidence base that is used to inform policy. Credible 
analysis requires a detailed understanding of public preferences regarding the policy trade-offs implicit in 
alternative investment options. Also, the methods and assumptions that underpin technical analysis 
need to be extensively discussed with relevant interested parties, as part of a deliberative process. 
Failure to foster this type of deliberative processes increases the potential for conflicting views about 
data, methods, system boundaries and optimisations to become polarised and undermine the quality of 
WKH SROLWLFDO GHEDWH HJ %UXLMQ DQG /HLMWHQ  ,W LQFUHDVHV LQ SDUWLFXODU WKH ULVN RI ³LQIRUPDWLRQ
ZDUV´ ZKHUH LQWHUHVW JURXSV DQG SROLWLFDO SDUWLHV IDFH LQFHQWLYHV VLPSO\ WR GUDZ RQ SDUtial pieces of 
evidence to support pre-determined positions.  
 
Such a political environment of this kind creates poor incentives for the creation of successful 
infrastructure policy. First, it is likely to impact directly on the quality of the decision-making process that 
underpins the selection of individual projects (e.g. Glaister et al. 2006; Helm, 2010, 2014). Second, it 
often leads to policy risk and uncertainty which, in turn, affects the readiness of the private sector to 
invest, and/or the costs of capital required for investment to materialise. In particular, firms may decide 
to delay investments in long-lived, irreversible assets because of policy uncertainty, or as a risk 
mitigating strategy. They may demand a higher equity risk premium to compensate for increased risk of 
default and higher costs of external finance. They may also prioritise projects with shorter time horizons 
that offer a quicker pay-off. 
 
Some studies link elections to cycles in corporate investment (e.g. Julio and Yook, 2012; Gulen and Ion, 
2013). Analysis of the US electricity industry indicates that firms invest less in new assets in states that 
have previously passed and repealed legislation to restructure the electricity industry, thus corroborating 
the hypothesis that regulatory instability reduces new investment (e.g. Fabrizio, 2012). Similarly, 
&DPELQLDQG5RQGL  ILQG WKDWSROLWLFDO LQWHUIHUHQFH LQUHJXODWRU\ IXQFWLRQV LVGHWULPHQWDO WR ILUPV¶
investment. More generally, there is a flourishing strand of literature that associates election periods, or 
other political changes, to increased stock market volatility (e.g. Bialkowski et al. 2008; Boutchkova et 
al., 2011, 2012); movements in bond yields; exchange rates; and equity volatility (e.g. Bernhard and 
Leblang, 2006). 
 
Third, weak deliberative processes are also likely to fuel opposition from groups that incur, or are 
perceived to incur, costs during and/or following the construction of infrastructure projects ± typically 
communities in the vicinity of infrastructure sites. This is further aggravated by a dearth of suitable 
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institutional mechanisms to promote negotiation and agreement on the nature and extent of externalities 
caused by individual projects and ways to compensate for them (e.g. Gibbons, 2014; Thompson, 2014; 
Ahlfeldt and Kavetson, 2014). 
 
([LVWLQJHPSLULFDOVWXGLHVLQGLFDWHWKDWRSSRVLWLRQWRGHYHORSPHQWLVRIWHQDVVRFLDWHGZLWKFRPPXQLWLHV¶
SHUFHSWLRQVDERXWSURMHFWV¶ ULVNVDQGDERXW WKH IDLUQHVVRI WKHVLWLQJSURFHVVHV HJ6FKLYHO\D
2¶+DUH; Petrova, 2013). Objective risk assessments tend to pale next to the risk perceptions of the 
public. Lack of trust in government is often cited as a source of opposition to proposed projects. 
Suspicion between supporters and opponents of individual projects is another obstacle. Distrust of 
experts involved in discussions about where to place infrastructure facilities and doubts about the 
credibility of their evaluations are additional sources of opposition. In particular, conflicting, multiparty, 
communicaWLRQV DERXW WKH HIIHFWV RI LQIUDVWUXFWXUH IDFLOLWLHV ULVN FUHDWLQJ DQ µLQIRUPDWLRQ KD]H¶ ZKLFK
prompts the public to shift from asking for additional information to becoming more entrenched in pre-
conceived views about those facilities. 
 
A related literature highlights the importance of effective community participation in planning decisions. 
The design of participatory processes, including decisions about who participates and when, the 
purpose of participation, how information is provided to participants, and how the process is organised, 
DOO VHHP WR LQÀXHQFH WKH TXDOLW\ RI SURMHFW SODQV DQG WKHLU LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ 6FKLYHO\ E *ULPHV
2005; Innes and Booher, 2010; Schenk and Stokes, 2013). These studies place an emphasis on the 
PHULWV RI D µFRQVHQVXV EXLOGLQJ DSSURDFK¶ ZKHUHE\ VWDNHKROGHUV DUH DVVHPEOHG IRU IDFH-to-face 
facilitated dialogue, to assess the various dimensions of a project, and to seek creative options that 
VDWLVI\HYHU\RQH¶VNH\QHHGVDQGFRQFHUQV 
 
II. The political economy of infrastructure in the UK 
 
The UK Westminster model has long been described as a paragon of majoritarian democracy (Lijphart, 
  7KH SUHYDLOLQJ QDUUDWLYH KLJKOLJKWV D XQLWDU\ DQG FHQWUDOLVHG VWDWH ³ZLQQHU-takes-DOO´
electoral rules, and a pluralist, competitive constellation of interest groups. Proportional representation is 
rejected in the name of clearly defined and easy-to-understand lines of accountability. The electoral 
system promotes concentration of power in single-party majority governments dominant before 
Parliament (Rose, 1974). The political culture often prizes confrontation over compromise (King, 2001)4. 
Against this background, one might be forgiven for anticipating UK governments to be defined by high 
organisational capacity, and decisive and coherent policymaking, possibly even geared for the long-
term. A more careful examination, however, leads to an entirely different set of expectations.  
 
In fact, the institutional architecture of strongly-majoritarian democracies involves a credibility 
conundrum (Majone, 1996). With a relatively small number of veto players and future governments with 
different partisan agendas, current policies can be easily reversed. While this implies greater adaptability 
to shifting public preferences (e.g. Jennings and John, 2009; John et al., 2013; Soroka and Wlezien, 
                                                        
4 This narrative has been qualified and in some cases contested (e.g. Bogdanor, 2009; King, 2010; Flinders, 2010; 
Jordan and Carney, 2013; Judge, 2014), but it still fits rather well the practice of politics and government in the UK 
(e.g. John et al. 2013; King and Crewe, 2013; Fukuyama, 2014). 
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2005; Bartle et al., 2011), it can also undermine the consistency and predictability of policy, damaging its 
effectiveness, particularly in areas where long-term commitment/credibility is important. This problem is 
aggravated in the British political system with its ingrained tendency to a high turnover of both senior 
officials and Ministers in cabinet reshuffles (e.g. Kam and Indridason 2005; and Indridason and Kam 
2006). 
 
Another important feature of the British political system is its intensely-partisan, adversarial culture, and 
reluctance to compromise (Hood, 2013; King and Crewe, 2013; Dellepiane-Avellaneda, 2014). Together 
with a competitive interest group system (Lijphart, 2012), it creates perverse incentives for the use of 
information that can harm policymaking. This is further compounded by the peculiaritieV RI %ULWDLQ¶V
electoral geography, and specifically the disproportionate influence on policymaking of core and 
marginal constituencies (Johnston, 1979; Johnston and Pattie, 1995, 2006; Ward and John, 1999; John 
and Ward, 2001; Besley and Preston, 2007; Ashcroft, 2010). 
 
Furthermore, there is no strong tradition in the UK of active consultation and engagement with local 
communities and other relevant stakeholders in policymaking, or compensation for the costs imposed 
upon them (e.g. Devine-Wright, 2011; Airports Commission, 2015). In practice, those left to make the 
case for infrastructure to local communities ± developers and government ministers ± are often the least 
trusted to do so (CBI, 2014).5 Too often the mechanisms of dispute resolution rely on legal challenges, 
public campaigns, political lobbying and public protest, leading to inefficient winner-take-all outcomes. 
 
None of these features fit well with the requirements for good governance of infrastructure investments. 
Policy credibility/commitment through wide cross-party consensus is of the essence to fostering 
investment in infrastructure. Yet, the British political system is designed to deliver alternation of powerful 
governments and ministers in government, with little incentives to negotiate and compromise. An 
intensely-partisan and adversarial culture, combined with numerous, competing interest-groups does not 
make for an environment that encourages and rewards rigorous assessment of policy alternatives and 
informed debate. And a weak tradition of engagement, deliberation, and compensation often motivates 
local communities and other stakeholders to oppose vehemently individual infrastructure projects.  
 
We would, therefore, expect infrastructure policymaking in the UK to be exposed to important failures in 
the form of policy instability, associated with lack of cross-party support and damaging incentives for 
private investors; inadequate consideration of policy alternatives leading to policies that are not 
grounded in firm empirical evidence; and failure to secure support/consent from sectors of society 
affected by proposed infrastructure projects. 
 
These failures are especially relevant considering that the UK needs to make major strategic 
infrastructure decisions over the next few years (NAO, 2013a; HMT, 2013). The investment needs come 
from climate change and energy security requirements (e.g. the UK is committed to a legally binding EU 
target to meet 15% of its energy demand from renewable sources by 2020, and to reducing greenhouse 
                                                        
5 Only 15% of people surveyed in CBI (2014) trust the companies building a project to explain its advantages and 
disadvantages to the local area. Ministers were the least trusted group in the survey at just 6%. The most trusted 
group according to the polling consists of technical experts, attracting 54% of approval. 
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gas emissions by at least 80% in the domestic Climate Change Act 2008); compliance with policies 
DLPHGDWSURWHFWLQJSXEOLFKHDOWKDQGWKHHQYLURQPHQWHJZDWHUFRPSDQLHVDUHUHTXLUHGE\WKH(8¶V
Water Framework Directive to meet environmental quality standards); maintenance and replacement of 
H[LVWLQJLQIUDVWUXFWXUHHJDILIWKRIWKH8.¶VH[LVWLQJHOHFWULFLW\JHQHUDWLQJFDSDFLW\LVSODQQHGWRFORVH
over the next decade); and coping with the pressure of rising population (the Office for National Statistics 
expects the UK population to increase to over 73 million people by 2035 ± ONS, 2014). 
 
It is also worth noting that the UK is rather unusual among advanced economies in the extent to which it 
relies on the private sector to finance and provide infrastructure, which exacerbates the damaging 
effects of the problems of credibility/commitment discussed above. Of the £375 billion (bn) that the 
Government estimates as planned and potential infrastructure investment for the rest of the decade and 
beyond, about two thirds is expected to be financed from the private sector, a fifth from public sources 
and the rest from a mix of public and private finance. Energy sector projects (the most significant in 
value among the £375 billion) are planned to be almost entirely privately financed. Transport projects 
(the second largest planned infrastructure investment) should be financed roughly equally through public 
funds and public-private partnerships (HMT, 2013). 
 
III. Case studies 
 
Electricity generation 
 
An important part of %ULWDLQ¶V HQHUJ\ JHQHUDWLQJ FDSDFLW\ KDV EHHQ RU LV LQ WKH SURFHVV RI EHLQJ
decommissioned. Coal and oil-fired power stations are facing closure because of pollution control 
requirements associated with an EU directive on large combustion plants. Old nuclear stations are 
coming to the end of their cycles. At the same time, the EU renewables directive implies that around 
RI%ULWDLQ¶VHOHFWULFLW\JHQHUDWLRQZLOOKDYHWRFRPHIURPUHQHZDEOHVE\ 
 
As a result of low (private) investment in new power plants, security concerns have been on the rise. 
Ofgem, the energy regulator, first sounded the alarm in a 2009 with references to an unprecedented 
challenge to secure supplies to consumers (Ofgem, 2013). In 2013, Ofgem stated that the margin 
between peak electricity demand and available supply could drop to between 2% and 5% by the winter 
of 2015-16, from more than 15% in 2011-µPDLQO\GXHWRDVLJQLILFDQWUHGXFWLRQLQHOHFWULFLW\VXSSOLHV
from coal aQGRLOJHQHUDWLRQSODQWFRXSOHGZLWKOLPLWHGLQYHVWPHQWLQQHZSODQW¶2I*HPS 
 
The situation reached a point that required the National Grid to pay companies to reduce their energy 
consumption during periods of peak demand ± typically between 4.00 pm and 8.00 pm on winter 
ZHHNGD\V7KHUH LVDOVRDQHZ µFDSDFLW\PHFKDQLVP¶ IRUJDV-fired power, under which generators are 
paid to keep their plants available as a back-up. And an array of government initiatives have been 
designed to bring forward new (private) investment in power generation. These have included 
subsidising the private sector; giving guarantees; and moving infrastructure assets into state ownership 
(Helm, 2013). As things stand we face rising costs, rising emissions due to increased coal use, and a 
greater risk of supply insecurity. 
University of Strathclyde | Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary: 39(3) Policy perspectives 
 
 
March 2016            8 
 
 
 
This is happening at the same time as energy prices are being drawn into a wider debate about the 
costs of living. This discussion has attracted a considerable amount of media attention, and has risen 
quickly in the political agenda, sparking references to tariff freezes, windfall taxes, and rolling-back 
subsidies for renewables. The result is heightened policy and regulatory uncertainty, which threatens to 
create a vicious circle of a high cost of capital, driven by high policy risk, leading to increases in energy 
prices which, in turn, lead consumers to put pressure on their political representatives to make policy 
changes. The prospect of policy changes raises policy risk further, and with it the cost of capital. 
 
The background to this is one of relative neglect, for more than a decade, of the conditions required for 
the private sector to invest in energy generation. After privatisation in the 1980s and early 1990s, there 
was a perception by many that energy markets were now to be treated like those of many other goods 
and services, i.e. subject to safeguards, but not in need of special attention. These were years of excess 
supply ± a legacy of the investments made in the 1970s ± North Sea oil and gas, low prices and no 
serious climate change constraints (e.g. Pearson and Watson, 2012). Within Whitehall, energy policy 
was downgraded from having its own department in 1980 to being part of a wider portfolio of one junior 
minister in 1997. Changes introduced to the regulatory regime at the end of the 1990s mostly 
disregarded the need to incentivise the market to provide excess capacity and ensure security of supply.  
The New Electricity Trading Arrangements, later converted into the British Electricity Trading and 
Transmission Arrangements, are often credited for incentivising a short-UXQVWUDWHJ\EDVHGRQµVZHDWLQJ
H[LVWLQJDVVHWV¶UDWKHUFDWHULQJIRU WKHORQJWHUPWKURXJKLQYHVWPHQW LQQHZSRZHU-generating capacity 
(e.g. Helm, 2008). 
 
It was not until the mid-2000s, with increasing concerns about climate change and security of supply, 
that these perceptions were reversed. Episodes such as the winter of 2005-06, when the Russians 
interrupted gas supplies to the Ukraine for a number of hours, leading to a spike in gas prices and the 
UK nearly running out of gas, contributed to the reversal of perceptions. Expectations that energy 
supplied by old plants would be replaced by new offshore wind farms and nuclear reactors proved 
unfounded. A flurry of white papers, consultations and acts of Parliament followed. Yet, these processes 
were marked by delays and reversals. Security of supply, cost competitiveness, and environmental 
sustainability (the goals that are often associated with energy policy) found varying support among 
parties and even among the same government. Commenting on nuclear energy, Helm (2013, p. 60) 
QRWHVWKDWµ>I@RU\HDUVJRYHUQPHQWVKDYHGHFLGHGWKDWWKH\GRQ¶WZDQWQXFOHDUDQGWKHQWKDWWKH\GR
that nuclear needs no public subsidy and then that it does, and that a waste solution should be found 
¿UVWDQG WKHQ WKDW LW LVQRWXUJHQW¶ ,QSUDFWLFH OLWWOHSURJUHVVZDVPDGH LQFUHDWLQJFRQGLWLRQV IRU WKH
private sector to invest in new supply. 
 
The approach that has dominated energy policy in recent years has also attracted criticism from 
independent experts and regulators. For example, in an interim report of an investigation into the energy 
market, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) criticised the subsidy that the Department of 
Energy and Climate Change (DECC) awarded to offshore wind projects through an administrative 
SURFHVVNQRZQDV ³)LQDO ,QYHVWPHQW'HFLVLRQHQDEOLQJ IRU5HQHZDEOHV´VFKHPH ),'H57KH&0$¶V
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analysis indicated that the support cost under the FIDeR scheme was 30% to 60% higher than that of 
VLPLODU RIIVKRUH ZLQG SURMHFWV DZDUGHG WKURXJK FRPSHWLWLYH DOORFDWLRQ D IHZ PRQWKV ODWHU '(&&¶V
decision might have resulted in an increase in costs for consumers of approximately £250± £310 million 
per year for 15 years, equivalent to a 1% increase in retail prices (CMA, 2015). 
 
Crucial assumptions that underpin the current energy strategy, its impact on carbon emissions and on 
the competitiveness of the UK economy, have also been criticised. Concerns have been raised, in 
particular, about the idea that oil and gas prices are bound to go up in incoming years as their stocks are 
GHSOHWHGWKHµSHDNRLOJDV¶WKHRU\DQGWKHQRWLRQWKDWZLWKHQRXJKVXEVLG\IURPFRQVXPHUVWKHFXUUHQW
generation of renewables is likely to become cost competitive, and make a difference to global warming 
(e.g. Helm, 2013). 
 
Furthermore, a number of independent analysts and commentators have expressed doubts about the 
impact of the current policy approach on costs for consumers and their willingness to support those 
costs. The National Audit Office, for example, has drawn attention to the fact that there has been no 
assessment of the overall impact of infrastructure on future bills or whether those bills will be affordable: 
µ7KHUHIRUHJRYHUQPHQWDQGUHJXODWRUVDUe taking decisions on behalf of consumers in the absence of full 
information about the situation for consumers. Affordability can only be assessed by taking into account 
all household bills, household incomes and wider costs of living. Gaps in analysis, and the lack of a 
common approach to measuring affordability, mean that the government does not have an overall 
SLFWXUHRIDIIRUGDELOLW\HLWKHUIRUWKHDYHUDJHKRXVHKROGRUIRUWKRVHRQORZLQFRPHV¶1$2ES
9). 
 
In short, evidence has been accumulating that suggests that UK energy policy since privatisation in the 
1980s has been short-sighted; that it has exposed private investors to important policy risks that might 
have harmed investment incentives; and that strategic policy decisions have often failed to be grounded 
in strong technical analysis.  
 
Railways ± HS2 
 
+6 LV WKH *RYHUQPHQW¶V IODJVKLS WUDQVSRUW LQIUDVWUXFWXUH SURMHFW WR EXLOG D KLJK-speed rail line from 
London to Manchester and Leeds, via Birmingham, the East Midlands, Sheffield and Crewe, to begin 
operation in 2026 and be completed by 2032/3. The total cost of the scheme is currently estimated at 
£42.6 billion for both phases with an additional £7.5 billion for rolling stock (Butcher, 2014a). It was 
supported by the Labour Government in 2009 and has had the support of the Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat Coalition Government (2010-15) and the current Conservative Government, elected in 2015. 
Despite this cross-party support, it has been the subject of great controversy over the last few years. 
There have been heated public debates focused on the value of such large, expensive schemes and 
their ability to foster economic growth, particularly in the north of England. These debates have also 
been accompanied by more technical, detailed discussions on matters related to the robustness of the 
GDWDDQG IRUHFDVWLQJ XVHG LQ WKH *RYHUQPHQW¶VEXVLQHVV FDVH IRU +6 WKH LPSDFW RQ MRXUQH\ WLPHV
carbon emissions, homes, communities and habitats.  
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The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) criticised the Department for Transport for making decisions 
µEDVHGRQIUDJLOHQXPEHUVRXW-of-GDWHGDWDDQGDVVXPSWLRQVZKLFKGRQRWUHIOHFWUHDOOLIH¶DQGKDYLQJD
ODUJHFRQWLQJHQF\WKDWDSSHDUHGµWREHFRPSHQVDWLQJIRUZHDNFRVWLQIRUPDWLRQ¶3$&S 
 
CommentLQJRQWKHSURMHFW¶VSUHSDUDWLRQWKH1DWLRQDO$XGLW2IILFHVWDWHGWKDW 
 
High Speed 2 is at a very early stage of planning and development and, as such, we cannot conclude on 
whether the programme is likely to deliver value for money. The cost and benefit estimates in its 
economic case are uncertain and will change because the programme is at an early stage. Furthermore, 
there have been past errors in the underlying model and some key data needs to be updated. In 
presenting its case for investment, the Department has poorly articulated the strategic need for a 
transformation in rail capacity and how High Speed 2 will help rebalance economic growth. The 
Department and HS2 Limited have started a lot of work recently to strengthen the evidence and analysis 
on which the case is based. The challenging programme timetable, however, makes delivering this work 
difficult and increases the risks that the programme will have a weak foundation for securing and 
demonstrating success in the future. 
(NAO, 2013c, p.11).  
 
The Treasury Select Committee published a report on the 2013 Spending Round and stated that the 
7UHDVXU\ VKRXOGQRW DOORZ+6 WRSURFHHG µXQWLO LW LVVXUH WKH FRVW-benefit analysis for HS2 has been 
updated to address fully the concerns raised by the NationaO $XGLW 2IILFH¶ WKDW WKH 7UHDVXU\ VKRXOG
SXEOLFO\TXDQWLI\WKHEHQHILWVIRU+6µQRWFDSWXUHGE\WKHH[LVWLQJHFRQRPLFDSSUDLVDO¶DQGWKDWSULRUWR
DQ\GHFLVLRQE\WKH7UHDVXU\WRSURFHHGZLWK+6LW µVKRXOGSXEOLVKLWVRZQFRPSUHKHQVLYHHFRQRPLF
case sXSSRUWLQJLWVGHFLVLRQ¶ (Treasury Committee, 2013, p.36.) 
 
Commenting on the origins of High Speed 2 in the Financial Times, former Business Secretary, Peter 
Mandelson said: 
 
µ,Q  ZKHQ WKH WKHQ /DERXU JRYHUQPHQW GHFLGHG WR EDFN +6 ZH GLG VR EDVHG Rn the best 
estimates of what it would involve. But these were almost entirely speculative. The decision was also 
partly politically driven. In addition to the projected cost, we gave insufficient attention to the massive 
GLVUXSWLRQWRPDQ\SHRSOH¶V OLYHVFonstruction would bring. Why? Not because we were indifferent but 
EHFDXVHZHEHOLHYHGWKHQDWLRQDO LQWHUHVWUHTXLUHGVXFKEROGFRPPLWPHQW WRPRGHUQLVDWLRQ«:HZHUH
focusing on the coming electoral battle, not on the detailed facts and figures of an investment that did 
not present us with any immediate spending choices. The vision was exciting, a lot of spadework had 
EHHQGRQHLQWKHWUDQVSRUWGHSDUWPHQWDQGWKHFDELQHWDGRSWHG+6DVD³QDWLRQDOFDXVH´FRPSHWLQJ
with the then Conservative leadership whose eQWKXVLDVP IRU WKH SURMHFW KDG SUHGDWHG RXU RZQ¶ 
(Mandelson, 2013) 
 
In 2015, an inquiry of the House of Lords Economic Affairs Select Committee into the economics of HS2 
concluded that: 
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µ7KH*RYHUQPHQWKDV\HWWRPDNHDFRQYLQFLQJFDVHIRUSURFHHGLQJZLWK WKHSURMHFW«LWLVQRWDWDOOFOHDU
that HS2 represents the best, most cost-effective solution to the problems it is intended to solve. The 
*RYHUQPHQW¶V WZRGHFODUHGREMHFWLYHV IRU WKHSURMHFW DUH WR LQFUHDVHFDSDFLW\RQ WKH UDLOZD\ WRPHHW
long-term demaQGDQG WR UHEDODQFH WKHHFRQRP\E\VWLPXODWLQJJURZWK LQ WKHQRUWKRI(QJODQG«2Q
capacity, published statistics on current rail usage do not suggest that there is an overcrowding problem 
on long-distance trains, either now or in the near future. On stimulating growth, the Government has not 
considered whether this could be better achieved by investing in improving regional links between 
northern cities. The Government claims that the biggest beneficiaries of the project will be business 
travellers, yet the evidence used to calculate the magnitude of this benefit (an estimated £40.5 billion) is 
out-of-date and unconvincing. Neither are we convinced why, if business travellers were the biggest 
beneficiaries from the project, they should not contribute more to WKHFRVWE\SD\LQJKLJKHUIDUHV¶ 
 
In the summer of 2014, while the controversy around HS2 was well underway, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer announced plans for a high-speed rail link between Manchester and Leeds as part of 
FUHDWLQJDµQRUWKHUQSRZHUKRXVH¶ 6 He implied the line could either involve a big upgrade to the existing 
trans-Pennine route between the two cities, or a construction of a new line, and admitted there was no 
VSHFLILFSODQEXWWKDWKHZDQWHGWRµVWDUWDFRQYHUVDWLRQ¶DERXWZKDWKDVEHHQGXEEHGµ+6¶ 
 
7KHLGHDRIFUHDWLQJDµQRUWKHUQSRZHUKRXVH¶UHFHLYHGZLGHVXSSRUW,WLVLQIDFWDQLGHDUHPLQLVFHQWRI
WKH SUHYLRXV JRYHUQPHQW¶V µQRUWKHUQ ZD\¶ ± a collaboration between three northern regional 
development agencies, which the Coalition Government abolished ± that, in 2011, drew a transport 
strategy stretching from Liverpool to Newcastle-upon-Tyne. But the idea of addressing connectivity 
problems in that region through a high-speed rail line sparked more controversy. Some commentators 
have drawn attention to the array of bottlenecks on existing roads and railways that limit the effective 
VL]H RI WKH UHJLRQ¶V HFRQRP\ FODLPLQJ WKDW +6 µLV DQRWKHU PXOWLELOOLRQ-pound solution in search of a 
SUREOHP¶)7HGLWRULDO 
 
The remarkVHFKRRQHRIWKHNH\FRQFOXVLRQVRI(GGLQJWRQSµ6PDOOHUSURMHFWVZKLFKXQEORFN
pinch-points, variable infrastructure schemes to support public transport in urban areas and international 
gateway surface access projects are likely to offer the vHU\ KLJKHVW UHWXUQV«+RZHYHU ODUJH SURMHFWV
ZLWKVSHFXODWLYHEHQHILWVDQGUHO\LQJRQXQWHVWHGWHFKQRORJ\DUHXQOLNHO\WRJHQHUDWHDWWUDFWLYHUHWXUQV¶ 
Long lasting controversy around the building of a high-speed railway line connecting London to the North 
of England is a powerful illustration of the problems that emerge from failing to build a credible evidence 
base through deliberative/participatory processes, and relying instead on public and political debates 
shaped by party-political tactics and competitions between interest groups.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
6 Greater Manchester and the Liverpool, Leeds and Sheffield city regions have a population of 9 million, a £154bn 
economy and almost 3 million jobs. 
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Aviation in the South-East of England 
 
The question of UK airport capacity has been considered a number of times over the last forty years 
(Helsey and Codd, 2014). Yet, little progress has been made since those discussions began. The only 
new runways built in recent decades were at London City and Manchester airports. London airports still 
rely on runways that have been in place since the middle of the twentieth century. Heathrow is now 
effectively full. Gatwick is operating at more than 85% of its maximum capacity and completely full at 
peak times. The UK is reaching the limits of existing airport infrastructure (Airports Commission, 2015). 
 
Capacity constraints at Heathrow are imposing high levels of delay and unreliability for passengers, 
OLPLWLQJWKHDLUSRUW¶VDELOLW\WRUHVSRQGWRRQH-off events, and to offer predictable patterns of respite from 
noise for local communities. In terms of connectivity, Heathrow still has a dominant position among 
European hubs on routes to North America and other established aviation markets, but it has not been 
able to establish a similar position in routes to emerging economies. Furthermore, the number of 
domestic routes to the airport is declining, restricting access from otheU 8. UHJLRQV WR +HDWKURZ¶V
network of international services. 
 
The problem around the expansion of aviation capacity in the South East of England is intimately related 
to perennial controversies surrounding the impact of increased flights on noise and air pollution levels 
(especially nitrogen dioxide) in surrounding areas, compounded by lack of adequate compensation 
mechanisms. The two combined create strong incentives for the parties affected (often a relatively small, 
focused group) to mobilise and oppose new projects or expansion of existing infrastructure. Crucially, 
these groups tend to be in electorally important suburban constituencies. 
 
Opposition to the expansion of Heathrow airport is a classic example. In 2007, the Labour Government 
ran a consultation on this question, which included, among other proposals, plans by BAA to add a third 
UXQZD\ ,WGLGQRW WDNH ORQJ IRU WKLVSURFHVV WRFRPHXQGHUVHYHUHFULWLFLVP IURP UHVLGHQWV¶FDPSDLJQ
groups, local authorities affected by the plans, national campaign groups, and a group of politicians from 
various parties. 
 
The response of the 2M Group ± DQ DOOLDQFH RI ORFDO DXWKRULWLHV DIIHFWHG E\ +HDWKURZ¶V RSHUDWLQJ
activities ± illustrates particularly well the consequences of failing to develop a constructive dialogue 
around the facts and figures that should inform negotiations and decisions concerning infrastructure 
SURMHFWV ,WVWDWHGWKDW LWVPHPEHUVZHUH µQRWDQWL-Heathrow but feel passionately that the Government 
consistently fails to either acknowledge or DVVHVVWKHDLUSRUW
V IXOOHQYLURQPHQWDO LPSDFW¶ ,WZHQWRQWR
say (2M Group, p1): 
 
This has been an inadequate consultation from the start. Member authorities have incurred considerable 
expense in commissioning specialist consultants to examine the data and arranging extensive local 
information exercises to make good the deficiencies of the Department for Transport's (DfT) own 
programme. A number of our members have submitted their own responses to the consultation. None of 
us feels that our submissions are complete. We have all been hampered by the inadequacy of the 
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information and the limited time allowed for analysis. The central issue here is one of trust. No one 
believes that this expansion will be the last. Stephen Nelson of BAA even admitted as much at the 
London Assembly Environment Committee evidentiary sessions. He could not rule out a fourth runway in 
the future. Our members are equally opposed to the third runway and the abandonment of runway 
alternation. No one believes that mixed mode is an interim measure. The history of Heathrow shows that 
once extra capacity is secured, it is never given up.  
 
In March 2008, The Sunday Times claimed that it had obtained documents under the Freedom of 
,QIRUPDWLRQ$FWZKLFKLQGLFDWHGWKDWWKHDLUSRUWVRSHUDWRU%$$KDGµFROOXGHGZLWKJRYHUQPHQWRIILFLDOVWR
³IL[´ WKH HYLGHQFH LQ IDYRXU RI D QHZ WKLUG UXQZD\ DW +HDWKURZ¶ 8QJRHG-Thomas Woolf, 2008). The 
Environment Agency, the environmental regulator, also raised doubts about the proposals, and in 
SDUWLFXODUµZKHWKHUWKHHFRQRPLFDQDO\VLVRIRSWLRQVIRU+HDWKURZLVUREXVW«ZHZRQGHUWRZKDWH[WHQW
the analysis has taken account of the other elements of the Air Transport White Paper preferred strategy 
for south-east airports (e.g. a new runway at Stansted), and to what extent these elements may lead to 
WKHGLVSODFHPHQWRIDQ\RIWKHLGHQWLILHGEHQHILWVRIH[SDQGLQJ+HDWKURZ¶($75S 
 
The 2010 Coalition Government set up an independent review that was asked to publish its findings 
after the 2015 general election. The Airports Commission, led by Sir Howard Davies, was tasked with 
DGYLVLQJRQRSWLRQVIRUPDLQWDLQLQJWKH8.¶VVWDWXVDVDQ LQternational hub for aviation and immediate 
actions to improve the use of existing runway capacity in the next five years. The Commission published 
LWVILQGLQJVLQ-XO\UHFRPPHQGLQJDQHZUXQZD\DW+HDWKURZWRJHWKHUZLWKDµVLJQLILFDQWSDFNDJH
of meaVXUHV¶ WRPLWLJDWH LWV LPSDFW RQ ORFDO FRPPXQLWLHVDQG WKHHQYLURQPHQW LQFOXGLQJDEDQRQDOO
flights between 11.30pm and 6am, a legally binding cap on noise levels, a levy to fund a more generous 
compensation package for those living under the flight path, and an independent noise regulator. 
 
7KH*RYHUQPHQWSOHGJHGWRFRQVLGHUWKHFRPPLVVLRQ¶VILQGLQJVDQGJLYHDGHWDLOHGUHVSRQVHE\WKHHQG
of the year. There is no guarantee that it will implement its recommendations. Senior figures in the 
Conservative party, such as Boris Johnson, mayor of London, Philip Hammond, the foreign secretary, 
and Zac Goldsmith, MP for Richmond Park (and prospective Conservative mayoral candidate), all of 
ZKRVH FRQVWLWXHQFLHV VLW XQGHU WKH DLUSRUW¶V IOLJKW SDWK KDYH FRPH RXW VWURQJO\ RSSRVLQJ +HDWKURZ¶V
expansion. The Liberal Democrats announced, in September 2014, before the Airports Commission 
published its analysis and recommendations that they would oppose, on environmental grounds, any 
IRUPRIDLUSRUWH[SDQVLRQµ:HUHPDLQopposed to any expansion of Heathrow, Stansted or Gatwick and 
any new airport in the Thames Estuary, because of local issues of air and noise pollution. We will ensure 
no net increase in runways across the UK as a whole by prohibiting the opening of any new runways 
XQOHVVRWKHUVDUHFORVHGHOVHZKHUH¶/LEHUDO'HPRFUDWVS 
 
Problems with the expansion of airport capacity in the south-east of England offer a strong illustration of 
the consequences of failing to promote serious, interactive engagement with local communities and to 
compensate them for the local costs that large infrastructure projects often involve.  
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Sewerage - Thames Tideway 
 
Underneath the whole of London is a sewerage system designed by Sir Joseph Bazalgette and built 
largely in the 1860s. Large quantities of sewage had been flushing directly into the river Thames 
destroying its ecosystem. Increasing population levels aggravated the problem. A sewerage network of 
about 21,000km was then built underneath London between 1859 and 1875. It served the 2.5 million 
people who were living in the city, and it was designed to accommodate an extra 1.5 million people living 
in London. Lately, it has been struggling to cope with a population of more than 8 million7.  
 
Hoping to resolve this problem, successive governments have, since 2007, supported the construction 
RI D EQ ³VXSHU VHZHU´ ± D NP ORQJ WXQQHO GHVLJQHG WR ERRVW WKH FDSDFLW\ RI WKH /RQGRQ¶V
sewerage network and prevent tens of millions of tonnes of sewage that every year overflow into the 
Thames. The project was granted planning consent in 2014. The Water Services Regulation Authority 
(Ofwat) approved its financing in August 2015. Construction is planned to start in 2016 and is meant to 
last for seven years. It will be the second largest infrastructure project in the UK and one of the biggest 
in Europe.  
 
The idea of building the tunnel dates back to 2005, when a study commissioned by Thames Water 
reported on potential solutions for the lack of sewerage capacity in London. The study concluded that 
the only practicable strategy to meet all environmental objectives was the interception of sewage spills 
before they reached the river. For that purpose, it proposed the construction of a 25km tunnel, running 
from Acton in the west of London through to Abbey Mills in the east (the so-FDOOHG µ7KDPHV7LGHZD\
7XQQHO¶DVSDUWRIDEURDGHULQYHVWPHQWSURJUDPZKLFKLQFOXGHGSODQVIRUDQRWKHUWXQQHODNPORQJ
tunnel for taking overflows away from the river Lee), and upgrades to five existing sewage treatment 
plants. 
 
The proposal has been embroiled in controversy ever since it was announced. In 2005, Philip Fletcher, 
Director General of Ofwat at the time, argued that further study should be carried out before any 
commitment was made to the proposal. In 2006, he advised ministers that there was scope for 
improvement options that would offer better value for money8, and on the following year, insisted the 
Thames Tideway project was not cost-effective and that other options should be explored: 
 
"All the work done to consider yet further improvements to the Tideway demonstrates that it would not 
achieve value for money. Indeed, the evidence strongly suggests that the benefits would be very limited 
from the proposed sewer interceptor, whether in terms of health improvement, nuisance reduction, or 
environmental improvements. Any such improvements would not in any way be proportionate to the very 
high cost ± well over £2 billion."9 
 
                                                        
7 E.g. in October 2012, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled that the UK was in breach of the European 
Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive. This has raised the prospect of a large lump-sum fine and daily fines being 
levied on the UK until it complies with the Directive. 
8 Letters from Philip Fletcher to Elliot Morley, 7th December 2005 and 14 February 2006. 
9 Letter from Philip Fletcher to Ian Pearson 31st January 2007. 
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Professor Chris Binnie, former chairman of the 2005 study that proposed the Thames Tideway solution, 
admitted years later that technical progress in sewage management had undermined the case for the 
project, and that alternatives should be considered. He challenged the cost-benefit calculations 
presented by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, arguing that faulty assumptions 
were both overstating the benefits of the tunnel and underestimating the effects of alternative solutions. 
His latest analysis contends that the upgrade of the sewage treatment works together with the 
construction of the Lee tunnel, on their own, should be enough to fulfil the objective of protecting the 
environment from the adverse effects of water discharges (Binnie, 2014).  
 
Sir Ian Byatt, head of Ofwat between 1989 and 2000, has also stated publicly that the tunnel is not 
QHFHVVDU\ DQG FDOOHG LW µD UHDO GLVDVWHU¶ 3OLPPHU  $FFRUGLQJ WR 6LU ,DQ µQHLWKHU 0LQLVWHUV QRU
regulators have set out the underlying analysis behind the Ministerial decision to opt for this solution. In 
the absence of this information, it looks as though alternatives have been brushed aside by Ministers, 
and that regulators have accepted this as a fait accomSOL¶%\DWWS 
,QDQµHDUO\UHYLHZRISRWHQWLDOULVNVWRYDOXHIRUPRQH\¶WKH1$2DFNQRZOHGJHGWKHFRQWURYHUV\
DURXQG WKH 7KDPHV 7LGHZD\ SURMHFW DQG VWUHVVHG WKDW µVXFK FODLPV HPSKDVLVH WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI
independent government scrutiny and quality assurance over the options appraisal in order to win public 
FRQILGHQFHWKDWYDOXHIRUPRQH\KDVEHHQVHFXUHG¶S7KHFKDLURIWKH3XEOLF$FFRXQWV&RPPLWWHH
0DUJDUHW+RGJHFDOOHGWKHSURMHFWµDJROG-plated solution that will lumber London water tax-payers with 
an £80-a-\HDUH[WUDELOOMXVWIRUWKLV¶3$&S 
 
/DWHO\FULWLFVKDYHWXUQHGWRWKHWXQQHO¶VXQXVXDOILQDQFLQJDUUDQJHPHQWV$ERXWRQH-third of the project 
is expected to be funded by Thames Water, with the remaining £2.8bn cost to be met by a consortium 
composed of German insurer Allianz, Swiss Life Capital and Dalmore Capital. There were only two bids 
to finance and build the project, which has raised concerns about lack of competition in the selection of 
that consortium. They will own, manage and finance the project during construction, and will later supply 
sewerage services to Thames Water on a 125-year concession. The investment will generate an income 
VWUHDP IURP GD\ RQH SDLG IRU E\ 7KDPHV :DWHU¶V FXVWRPHUV 0HDQZKLOH WKH ULVNV RI FRQVWUXFWLRQ
including cost overruns, accidents or other inciGHQWVDW WKHSURMHFW¶VVLWHV WRJHWKHUZLWKD UDQJHRI
financial risks (e.g. another global collapse in credit) will be borne by taxpayers as government is acting 
as guarantor (Plimmer, 2015; Ofwat, 2015a). 
 
The Thames Tideway Strategic Study originally estimated the cost of a single full-length tunnel at £1.7bn 
(2004 prices) and the increase in Thames Water residential customer bills at £40 to £45 annually. This 
was later revised by Thames Water to an estimated total cost of £4.2bn (2011 prices) and a maximum 
increase in bills of between £70 and £80 annually (NAO, 2014). In 2015, Ofwat announced that it 
expected the tunnel to have an impact on bills between £20 and £25 (Ofwat, 2015b). 
 
In summary, the process that led to the approval of the Thames Tideway Tunnel offers a powerful 
illustration of how deficiencies in building a credible evidence base through active engagement of a wide 
range of stakeholders can give rise to conflicting analysis, continuous controversy, and eventually policy 
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decisions of dubious quality. Indeed, when it comes to infrastructure policymaking, the British political 
system appears to struggle even with those projects that have cross-party support. 
 
IV. Key findings and policy implications 
 
Important challenges lie ahead for UK infrastructure. Energy security, compliance with environmental 
regulation, maintenance and replacement of existing infrastructure, and increasing population, are only a 
few examples from a wide range of pressures that will impact on UK infrastructure for decades to come. 
Successfully addressing these challenges will require large-scale investment. In contrast to most other 
developed countries, the UK relies extensively on the private sector to finance and provide 
infrastructure. Government still plays a pivotal role, however, both by designing policy and regulatory 
frameworks and by investing directly in individual projects, alone or in partnership with the private sector. 
Poor policy decisions could lock the economy into inadequate and/or overly-costly infrastructure systems 
for many years to come, placing a heavy burden on future prosperity. 
 
The evidence reviewed in this paper suggests there are important problems in the way the UK makes 
strategic infrastructure decisions, these include short-sightedness; lack of cross-party agreement which 
exposes private investors to high levels of policy risk; deficiencies in the development of the evidence 
base that underpins projects with cross-party support; and failure to secure public consent, which often 
leads to political procrastination. Many of these problems appear to be largely associated with the 
absence of institutions that effectively engage politicians, experts, interest groups and local communities 
in the policymaking process. Without credible, participatory processes, the politics around infrastructure 
investments in the UK is often trapped by unconstructive interactions between party-political tactics, 
pressures from interest groups, and hostility from local communities.  
 
There are several international examples of infrastructural innovation from which the UK could learn. 
The United States has been experimenting for several decades with ways of making consumers, or their 
representatives, take a more active role in the regulatory processes through constructive engagement, 
and negotiated agreement and settlement. In the Netherlands, the so-called Alders Table ± a 
consultative body responsible specifically designed to formulate advice to government on plans for 
Schiphol airport ± was successful in creating a forum for national and municipal governments, 
representatives of local communities, and parties involved in aviation to come together and discuss 
mutually-advantageous solutions. The success of that initiative inspired the creation of similar 
consultative bodies across the country. In France, the Commission Nationale du Débat Public ± a state-
funded, independent body ± has been playing an important role in ensuring the public participates 
effectively in decision-making processes about projects that have major effects on the environment and 
land use. The work of the Australian Productivity Commission has also been praised for its role in 
fostering informed public and political debates through a mixture of solid research and public input and 
scrutiny. Within the confines of current constitutional architecture, these examples of institutional 
innovation may offer the best guides for reforming the governance of infrastructure investment in the UK. 
,Q2FWREHUWKH8.*RYHUQPHQWDQQRXQFHGWKHODXQFKRIDµ1DWLRQDO,QIUDVWUXFWXUH&RPPLVVLRQ¶
an independent body that is supposed to enable long term strategic decision making to build effective 
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and efficient infrastructure for the UK. If the Commission manages to replicate some of the best practice 
of the international examples mentioned above, it could play an important role in filling the institutional 
gap that we discussed in this paper.  
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